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Did the U.S. government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization overturn bankruptcy law? Critics argue that the government-sponsored reorganization impermissibly elevated claims of the auto union over those of Chrysler's other creditors. If the critics are correct, businesses might suffer an increase in their cost of debt because creditors will perceive a new risk, that organized labor might leap-frog them in bankruptcy. This paper examines the financial market where this effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. The authors find no evidence of a This paper-a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the department to examine the role of the state in market development. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at danginer@worldbank.org. negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by bondholders of unionized firms. They thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities. To the contrary, bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. This evidence suggests that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind unionized firms. The results are consistent with the notion that toobig-to-fail government policies generate moral hazard in the credit markets.
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I. Introduction
In late 2008 and early 2009, the outgoing Bush and incoming Obama administrations announced a series of steps to assist Chrysler, the struggling automaker, in an extraordinary intervention into private industry. Some charge that the government, in implementing the bailout, impermissibly favored the auto union over Chrysler's secured bondholders. As these critics see it, the government attempted to save the politically powerful union by elevating the unsecured claims of organized labor above the secured claims of the bondholders, contrary to well-established creditor priorities in bankruptcy. If the critics are correct, the Chrysler bailout could represent an overturning of bankruptcy law in the U.S.
A long-standing principal of bankruptcy law requires that a debtor's secured creditors be repaid, in full, before its unsecured creditors receive anything. However, critics argue that the government structured Chrysler's bankruptcy reorganization so that
Chrysler's unsecured creditor, the auto union, got paid before Chrysler's secured creditors were fully repaid. The auto union walked away from the reorganization with $1.5 billion in cash, a $4.6 billion note, and a majority equity stake in the reorganized
Chrysler, despite the fact that Chrysler's bondholders, who were secured creditors, had not been repaid in full. Although they had a $6.9 billion secured claim on Chrysler, the bondholders received only $2 billion in the reorganization, or twenty-nine cents on the dollar.
As critics view the Chrysler reorganization, the bankruptcy laws established by Congress were arbitrarily overthrown by an act of the Executive, undermining longestablished tenants of debt financing. They believe that, in protecting the interests of taxpayers, the Treasury negotiated aggressively with the secured creditors but, in protecting the interests of organized labor, the Treasury offered the union special treatment. 1 Hence, the critics attack the Chrysler reorganization as a government transfer 4 companies." 9 Those participants believe "lenders will have to figure out how to price this risk ….
[Either] don't lend money to a company with big legacy liabilities, or demand a much higher rate of interest because you may be leap-frogged in a bankruptcy." 10 A
Congressional panel hypothesized that "Treasury's involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy … is likely to cause investors to reevaluate their risk assessment regarding certain companies with similar characteristics." 11 In other words, if a government bailout distorts creditor priorities, lenders may think twice before making secured loans to firms that might receive a government bailout, due to the risk that junior creditors might leapfrog them when the company experiences financial distress.
Critics distinguish public bailouts from other reorganizations because dealing with the U.S. government is not the same as dealing with private DIP lenders. The
Treasury can exert greater influence over the parties than a private lender can. One reason is that "the government [can] accuse a bondholder … of failing to assume some correct proportion of 'shared sacrifice. '" 12 For example, President Obama referred to
Chrysler's dissident bondholders as "speculators" who were "refusing to sacrifice like everyone else." 13 The U.S. government "has a throw weight that its counterparties cannot match, as there is little in the regular commercial arsenal that can counter a charge of 'unpatriotic' behavior by the President of the United States." 14 Moreover, some critics fear that the Chrysler bailout is not an isolated, one-time event. Further government interventions using TARP funds have been suggested. For example, a Congressional panel, in its report on the use of TARP funds to support the auto industry, asked Treasury to "provide its legal analysis justifying the use of TARP funds for this purpose. This analysis will inform policymakers' and taxpayers' understanding of the potential for Treasury to use its authority to assist other struggling 9 Caroline Salas, Fund Managers Burned by Obama Now Say They Are Wary, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5u0MEwLik7A (May 20, 2009, 18:13 EDT) . 10 Id. 11 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 12 Id. at n.506. 13 Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Remarks by the President on the Auto Industry (April 30, 2009 ), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-onthe-Auto-Industry. 14 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at n.506.
5
industries." 15 The panel's report even lays out criteria for further Treasury interventions (in Section D). Hence, critics say the Chrysler bailout demonstrates the federal government's inclination to intervene in private industry when politically motivated.
Some market players assert that, with "anything that involves a large number of jobs or affects a large number of people, you can expect to see a Chrysler redux." 16 Because of such possibilities, companies that are public bailout candidates may face higher borrowing costs than companies not at risk of government intervention.
Notwithstanding the criticisms, the Chrysler bailout does have its supporters.
Supporters argue that the public assistance to Chrysler was a reluctant intervention by a lender of last resort acting through a clever but legal manipulation of the bankruptcy system. Supporters add that, in any event, the decision to assist Chrysler is an isolated policy choice that should have no ramifications beyond the auto industry. Others point out that priority violations in bankruptcy have become commonplace, especially with the development of the claims trading markets in recent decades, and should cause no alarm.
In other words, the Chrysler bailout has generated an important debate among market participants and academics in bankruptcy and finance. Did the government intervene in Chrysler in a manner that overturns bankruptcy law in the U.S.? This study answers that question by performing an empirical analysis of the bailout's impact on credit markets.
The same question was raised by Congress when it established an oversight panel in connection with TARP to review "the impact of Treasury decisions on the financial markets." The panel sought to examine "whether predictions that the Chrysler decision would result in changes in market behavior or the cost of capital were (1) accurate and (2) measurable."
17
In its report to Congress, the panel concluded that "there is little evidence, empirical or anecdotal," to answer the question. The panel believed that it is "too early and, given the number of variables, perhaps not possible to conclude one way or another as to what effect the government's involvement in the Chrysler bankruptcy will have on the credit markets." 18 We, however, disagree with the panel's conclusion.
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This study performs the crucial empirical analysis of the government's bailout of
Chrysler that the oversight panel did not attempt.
We answer the question empirically by examining the financial market where the effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies. If the government, in order to favor organized labor, implemented the Chrysler reorganization in a manner that ignored established lending priorities, investors in other unionized companies should have perceived increased risk. Rational investors would price this increased risk into the debt of the unionized firms. We test this claim empirically and find no evidence of a negative reaction to the Chrysler bailout by the bondholders of unionized firms. We thus reject the notion that investors perceived a distortion of bankruptcy priorities in the Chrysler case.
To the contrary, we find that bondholders of unionized firms reacted positively to the Chrysler bailout. During the period when the Chrysler bailout was being formulated, adopted, and implemented, bonds of unionized firms generated lower yields (i.e., traded at higher prices in the bond markets) than bonds of non-unionized companies. Unionized firms also generated greater returns over the period for their bondholders than nonunionized firms generated for their bondholders. That is, it appears that bondholders interpreted the Chrysler bailout as a signal that the government will stand behind the obligations of unionized firms. In other words, the Chrysler bailout created a perception that unionized companies will receive preferential treatment from the government. This result suggests that the bailout generated moral hazard in the credit markets. Although the result is not dispositive of the issue, the paper provides empirical support for a link between "too-big-to-fail" government policies and moral hazard in the financial markets.
The next section describes the federal government's bailout of Chrysler. Section III presents the hypotheses to be tested. Section IV identifies the related literature.
Section V describes the data and the methodologies employed. The empirical results are presented in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. The Reorganization of Chrysler
In December, 2008, Chrysler (along with General Motors) was on the brink of insolvency. The automaker could not obtain the financing needed to conduct day-to-day 7 operations. Chrysler, which employed over 55,000 workers, turned to the U.S. and a 55% equity stake in New Chrysler. 39 As a result, New Chrysler's commitment to fund retiree healthcare benefits is not as burdensome as the one that weighted down its predecessor, while the UAW Trust walks away from the reorganization with a greater payout than it would have received had it remained solely an unsecured creditor of Old
Chrysler.
During the bankruptcy proceedings, three Indiana state pension funds objected to Old
Chrysler's sale of its assets to New Chrysler and the release of their liens. 40 The Indiana pension funds were among the first-priority secured lenders of Old Chrysler. 41 The dissident pension funds argued that the sale would improperly result in value going to the unsecured creditors before the secured creditors had been paid in full. 42 Specifically, the pension funds pointed out that, according to the terms of the sale documents, an unsecured creditor of Old
Chrysler, the UAW Trust, would receive payments (consisting of $1.5 billion in cash from New Chrysler, a 55% equity stake in New Chrysler, and a $4.6 billion note issued by New Chrysler) before Old Chrysler's secured creditors had been paid in full.
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The Indiana pension funds and the other first-priority secured lenders, receiving $2 billion from the sale on their $6.9 billion claim, would be receiving only twenty-nine cents on the dollar, while the UAW Trust, an unsecured lender, would be receiving payments worth billions of dollars.
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The Indiana pension funds argued that the sale would violate creditor priorities, making it an illicit sub rosa confirmation plan. [I]n negotiating with those groups essential to is viability, New Chrysler made certain agreements and provided ownership interests in the new entity, which was neither a diversion of value from the Debtors' assets nor an allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' assets. The allocation of ownership interests in the new enterprise is irrelevant to the estates' economic interests.
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The bankruptcy court viewed the payments to the UAW Trust as "provided under separatelynegotiated agreements with New Chrysler" and not on account of their pre-petition claims on
Old Chrysler.
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The Indiana state pension funds immediately appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling.
The Second Circuit issued a short order ratifying the bankruptcy court's decision and issuing a stay to allow for the U.S. Supreme Court's review. The Supreme Court, however, denied a request for a stay of the bankruptcy reorganization. 49 Upon remand, the Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. 50 The Second Circuit decided that all consideration paid to the UAW Trust by New Chrysler was in exchange for new value given, not in exchange for the UAW Trust's claim on the debtor's estate. 51 Hence, the court concluded that the transaction was consistent with bankruptcy priority rules and that the asset sale did not constitute a sub rosa confirmation plan. 
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III. Hypotheses
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The Chrysler bailout was interpreted not only by the courts, but also by the credit markets. Did market participants believe the Chrysler bailout jeopardized lending priorities? The question may be answered empirically by examining the market where an effect would be most detectible, the market for bonds of highly unionized companies.
Depending on how market participants viewed the government's intervention in the Chrysler reorganization, the transaction could have produced a positive, a negative, or an insignificant impact on bond prices of unionized companies.
H1: The federal government's intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy overturned creditor priorities under bankruptcy law, generating a fundamental change in how reorganizations will be conducted.
The first hypothesis is that the bond market interpreted the Chrysler bailout as an alteration of the long-standing absolute priority rule of bankruptcy. The absolute priority rule provides that claimants be paid in order of seniority, with secured creditors ranking ahead of unsecured creditors, who rank ahead of equity holders. A secured creditor, which lends to a debtor against collateral, expects to have a lower risk of non-payment than were it an unsecured creditor, and prices the loan accordingly. As a result, Critics of the Chrysler reorganization argue that the transaction establishes a dangerous precedent by validating a deal structure that disregards creditor priorities in 14 bankruptcy. 53 The Bankruptcy Code requires that creditors receive "fair and equitable" treatment. 54 Fair and equitable treatment requires in part that a junior-priority class of claims may not receive assets from the debtor while a more senior class of claims has not been paid in full and objects to the payment. 55 In Chrysler, certain secured creditors objected to the asset sale because they would only receive twenty-nine cents on the dollar while the UAW Trust, with a lower priority claim, would receive billions of dollars.
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These secured creditors also attempted to invoke the rule against "unfair discrimination."
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The rule against unfair discrimination requires that similarly ranked creditors be paid pro rata. 58 Since the value of the secured creditors' claims exceeded the value of Chrysler's collateral, the secured creditors were deemed to be in part secured creditors (to the extent of the value of the collateral) and in part unsecured creditors (to the extent of their deficiency claim, the amount by which their secured claims exceed the value of the collateral). 59 Hence, with respect to their deficiency claim, the secured creditors were unsecured, ranking in priority equal to the UAW Trust and other unsecured creditors. 60 Yet the asset sale resulted in cash and securities being paid to the unsecured UAW Trust, while nothing was paid to the secured creditors on their deficiency claim.
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The secured creditors argued that this result constitutes unfair discrimination. 62 These arguments were ultimately rejected in court.
As critics view the Chrysler reorganization, the bankruptcy law established by Congress were arbitrarily overthrown by an act of the Executive, undermining long- The second hypothesis is that the credit market believed the government was acting as an arm's-length participant in a section 363 asset sale, which has become an increasingly common means to exit bankruptcy. 63 Proponents of the bailout argue that, although TARP money was used to fund the reorganization, the Treasury was nothing more than a debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender in an otherwise typical bankruptcy reorganization. 64 Although the involvement of the Treasury in place of a private lender may have been novel, the use of DIP financing and an asset sale to effect a reorganization was not. Hence, from this viewpoint, the transaction left unaltered established bankruptcy practices and priorities. Therefore, prices of bonds of unionized companies (and their yields) should not exhibit any significant change around the Chrysler bailout.
Proponents of the reorganization assert that no payments were made to the UAW Trust on account of the Trust's pre-petition claims on Old Chrysler. Instead, they argue that the payments to the UAW Trust were extracted from New Chrysler, the newlyconstituted entity, as the product of a fresh negotiation between the Trust and New
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While the proceeds that the debtor receives in an asset sale must be 63 See Stephen J. Lubben, Appendix to Testimony Before Oversight Panel, (July 27, 2009) . 64 See Warburton (2010) for a more detailed delineation of the arguments in defense of the Chrysler reorganization. See also Morrison (2009) and Lubben (2009) . 65 Critics respond that the asset sale by Old Chrysler did more than merely sell assets for cash. The sale effectively determined which creditors of the Old Chrysler would get paid, and how much they would be distributed to its creditors in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code's priority rule, the purchaser of assets is not restrained by the Code in its use of those assets, the price it pays to acquire them, or any other manner. 66 Proponents observe that the purchaser is free to strike any deal it can with its own financers, suppliers, labor unions, and other stakeholders. If these stakeholders establish relationships with the purchaser on more favorable terms than "those whose relationships terminated with the bankruptcy estate, this perceived disparity has a clear business reason; i.e., the purchaser needs to maintain these relationships to make its business viable."
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For instance, if the purchaser needs to continue ordering from the debtor's suppliers, then those suppliers may be paid by the purchaser even though the suppliers are entitled to nothing from the debtor under Chapter 11. The two transactions are independent; there is no "exchange" of claims against the debtor for payments from the purchaser. This is the case so long as payments from the purchaser are made in exchange for the provision of goods or services to the purchaser. According to supporters of the Chrysler asset sale, the assets were purchased cleanly and appropriately from Old In addition, supporters believe that it is not alarming, or even unusual, that the U.S. Treasury pushed for favorable treatment of certain stakeholders, the UAW retirees.
The Treasury was the DIP lender, with the power and influence that role confers in any bankruptcy. As Chrysler's condition deteriorated, the government provided both pre-and post-petition financing. On account of the government's pre-petition claim, it had the rights of a pre-petition creditor entitled only to distributions from the bankruptcy estate in accordance with priority rules under Chapter 11. On account of its post-petition claim, however, the government had power and leverage as a DIP financer. 69 Because no postpetition lender is required to lend to the debtor and because dealing with bankrupt businesses is often regarded as quite risky, the leverage of the DIP lender is extremely high. As a result, DIP lenders routinely use the terms of the new loan to assume control and shape the outcome of the reorganization (for example, by deciding which contracts with suppliers, dealers, labor, etc. it wishes the debtor to assume Moreover, some proponents argue that the Chrysler reorganization is a one-off transaction with no precedential value, due to the unusual circumstances surrounding it.
The reorganization required heavy government involvement. Without the government flooding the businesses with cash, proponents believe the creditors might not have agreed to the terms of the reorganization. That is, any priority violation was accompanied by a large cash infusion from the government to help the company stay afloat. The downside to creditors of a priority violation was offset by the benefits of keeping the debtor in 72 Lubben (2009) 
H3: The federal government's intervention in the Chrysler bankruptcy added moral hazard to the financial markets by issuing an implicit guarantee of the obligations of similar companies.
The third hypothesis is that, as a result of the government's intervention in the We test these hypotheses empirically in this paper.
IV. Related Literature
When it established the TARP, Congress created an oversight panel (the However, those studies focus on the subordination of creditors to equity holders, not the subordination of one (senior) creditor class to another (junior) creditor class, as this paper does.
Unlike those studies, which treat creditors as a single, unified class, this study examines conflict between senior and junior classes of creditors. That is, we focus on the purported subordination of secured creditors to unsecured, but politically-favored, creditors. This is an important line of inquiry. A secured creditor, which lends to a 75 PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 53. 76 One of the academics consulted by the Oversight Panel stated, "I am unaware of empirical support for the claim that the Chrysler and General Motors cases will increase the cost of capital to corporate debtors." Yet, the same academic believed that, given these cases, "one might expect future firms to face a higher cost of capital." Adler (2009) at 6. 77 Weiss looks at the claims of secured creditors, unsecured creditors, and equity holders in bankruptcy from 1979 to 1986, but finds no violations of the secured creditors' priority. Chen et al. (2010b) finds that firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields than firms in lesser unionized industries. The authors of that study believe bondholders view unions favorably because they place a check on management, mitigating agency within the firm. But Chen et al. does not examine the role of public support for unionized companies, which is the focus of our paper.
Moreover, Chen et al. studies the period 1984-98. In contrast, our paper focuses on the recent financial crisis and the government's response. As such, we are able to examine whether government bailouts of unionized firms have an impact on bond prices.
V. Data & Methodologies
In this section, we briefly describe the data sources used in this study. corporate bonds listed in FISD that satisfy a set of selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature. 85 We remove all bonds with equity or derivative features (i.e., callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), bonds with warrants, bonds with floating interest rates, and bonds with any credit enhancements. We also eliminate all bonds that have less than one year to maturity or have been issued less than a year ago, and require all bonds to have an assigned rating and SIC code. As we are interested in industrial firms, we remove all financial firms from the sample (SIC codes 6000-6999). So as to not bias our analyses, we also remove from the sample Ford, General Motors and
Chrysler. To be able compute daily bond returns, we also require bonds to have traded on two consecutive days over the sample period. Our final sample consists of 508 bonds from 269 firms.
Bond returns are calculated as:
where P t is the clean price of the bond, AI t is the accrued interest over one period, and C t is the coupon payment whenever it is paid (in which case AI t = 0). To remove potential data entry errors, we follow Bessembinder et al. (2006) by requiring that the absolute value of the return be less than 30%. As there are multiple bonds for each firm, company-level returns are computed by value-weighting individual bond returns using their market values.
To identify firms subject to collective bargaining, we go through 10-K reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission by the 269 firms in our 84 TRACE reports prices for roughly 95% of all corporate bond transactions. The only transaction that are not reported are those that take place in exchanges. 85 See, for instance, Duffee (1999) , Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Avramov et al. (2006) .
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We categorize companies as unionized or non-unionized. We define a unionized company as one where 30% or more of its workforce is unionized or covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 87 We are unable find unionization rates for all the firms in our sample. Of the 269 firms in our sample, we are able to find unionization rates for 163 firms. Of the 163 firms, we classify 69 as unionized.
Conceivably, there could be significant differences between unionized and nonunionized companies that might impact our results. Hence, we want to be sure that our results do not reflect differences between the two sets of firms, particularly regarding differences in credit risk. We compute summary statistics for various default measures and financial characteristics of unionized and non-unionized companies. These are the same measures used in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) and discussed in detail in that paper. These results are summarized in bm is the book-to-market ratio. lme is the log of market capitalization.
nimtavg measures profitability and is calculated as a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets. Leverage is measured by tlmta, which is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets. 86 As a robustness check, we also examined industry-level unionization rates, which are obtained from the Union Membership and Coverage Database (Unionstats). This database provides annual industry estimates at the 4-digit level. Results, however, do not substantially differ from the reported results employing firm-level unionization rates. Moreover, there is a 58% correlation between firm-and industrylevel unionization rates. 87 As a robustness check, we also employed alternative methodologies: (i) we used different percentages (20% and 50%) to define a unionized company; and (ii) we sorted companies into, alternatively, three buckets and five buckets, based upon unionization rates. Results, however, do not substantially differ from the reported results employing the 30% unionization definition. 88 
where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, OENEG is a dummy variable set equal to one if total liabilities exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets, FUTL is the ratio of funds from operations to total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is change in net income over the last quarter: (NI t -NI t−1 )/(|NI t | + |NI t−1 |). 89 We regress daily stock returns from the previous calendar year on the Fama-French 3 factors: r = 25 chs-pd is the default probability, calculated as in Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) . 90 Merton-DD is the Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure. The computation of merton-DD is described in detail in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) . Rating is the S&P 500 rating, where the rating has been converted to numeric values (AAA = 1, …, C = 13).
Finally, maturity is the average maturity of the bonds for a firm and is measured in years. Table 1 reports that, along most of the financial characteristics described above, unionized and non-unionized companies are similar. The results indicate that, relative to the non-unionized companies, the unionized companies are less profitable, have bonds with slightly longer maturities, and have slightly lower-ranked ratings. Unionized companies are also larger and have more liabilities relative to assets. But with respect to other financial ratios and credit risk measures, we do not see statistically significant differences. That is, unionized and non-unionized companies are the same in terms of aggregate volatility, idiosyncratic volatility, default probability, distance to default, and default score. These results suggest that the two set of companies have similar creditriskiness characteristics.
VI. Results
In this section, we examine yields and returns on corporate bonds over the 2008 and 2009 period. We then conduct an event study of abnormal bond returns on key event dates relating to the Chrysler bailout. Figure 2 shows the yields on bonds of unionized companies and non-unionized companies. Results are shown separately for high-yield and investment-grade bonds.
For investment grade bonds, the yield on bonds of unionized companies tracks the yield 
NIMT A A V G T LMT A EX R ET
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log of the ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, and PRICE is the log of the price per share truncated from above at $15.
however, the yield of "non-unionized" bonds spikes, while the yield of "unionized" bonds remains flat. In other words, the price of the non-unionized bonds in the secondary market dropped in late 2008, with the worsening of the financial crisis, while the prices of the unionized bonds held steady. The stability of the unionized bond prices is consistent with investors' expectations of public support for unionized companies.
Investors perceived unionized bonds to be less risky than the non-unionized bonds during the crisis.
More interesting than investment-grade bonds, however, are high-yield bonds.
Since the high yield bonds pose a greater risk of non-payment, their yields should be more sensitive to government policies. Figure 2 shows that the high-yield bonds follow a trend similar to, but more pronounced than, that of the investment-grade bonds.
With respect to the high-yield bonds, the yield for unionized companies tracks the yield for non-unionized companies during 2008. Yields on both unionized and nonunionized bonds spike in the latter part of 2008, with the worsening of the financial crisis.
In early 2009, however, the yield on non-unionized bonds shoots above that of unionized bonds. And this spread between yields persists through the remainder of 2009.
Again, the relatively lower yield on the unionized bonds (i.e., their relatively higher price in the secondary market) reflects investor's expectations of public support for the unionized firms. As with investment-grade bonds, investors in high-yield bonds perceive the unionized bonds to be less risky than the non-unionized bonds during the crisis.
These results are generally consistent with earlier studies finding that firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields (e.g., Chen, Kacperczyk, and OrtizMolina 2010b). By focusing on the 2008-09 period, our study demonstrates that the findings of earlier studies continue to hold during a financial shock and economic recession, and that the trends are exaggerated by the adoption of a public bailout policy. Over the period we study, there is no evidence that investors were worried about political interference in unionized firms as a consequence of the bailouts. To the contrary, investors reacted positively to the prospect of public support.
We also undertake an event study of bond returns in order to pinpoint when and how the bailout impacted the credit market. Key event dates relating to the bailout are set forth in the Appendix hereto. To compute abnormal returns, we use the five-factor bond model developed in Fama and French (1993) . This model is an extension of the commonly used three-factor stock return model, which includes factors for the market risk premium (or MKT), firm size (small minus big, or SMB), and value (high minus low, or HML). The bond model adds two additional factors: TERM, which represents the slope of the Treasury yield curve, and DEF, the default premium measured as the difference between the returns on long-term corporate bond indices and long-term Treasuries. Formally, the model developed by Fama and French to estimate expected bond returns is:
91 The rating groups are (i) AAA to AA-; (ii) A+ to A-; (iii) BBB+ to BBB-; and (iv) BB+ to C.
To the model, we add a dummy variable, DATE_DUMMY, that takes on a value of one during a three-day window around the event dates (t-1, t, t+1) which we study in this paper.
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The results from these regressions are reported in Table 2 It may be that the possibility of a bailout was still too uncertain. That uncertainty, however, was resolved on December 19. 92 We find similar results using simply the event dates, and using a five-day window around event dates.
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December 19 • Chrysler is not viable as a stand-along company and must merge with Fiat.
• The best chance for success would "require utilizing the bankruptcy code in a quick and surgical way." • The company will have additional time (30 days) to produce a new, more aggressive viability plan, in order to pursue an alliance with Fiat (or another company) and to gain bigger concessions from stakeholders, particularly creditors and the UAW. If an acceptable plan is not submitted by then, government support will end and bankruptcy will be the likely course.
The findings indicated that Treasury intended to intervene more deeply than expected into the affairs of the auto company.
Bond returns, however, did not respond in a significant manner. Treasury's announcement had an insignificant impact on bonds of unionized and non-unionized companies. None of these event dates, however, produces a significant impact on bond returns. The structure of the Chrysler reorganization was challenged but upheld in the bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet, none of those decisions generated significant abnormal returns on bonds of unionized or non-unionized companies.
VII. Conclusion
We find that bondholders responded positively to the government's decision to assist Chrysler. That is, bondholders approved of the bailout decision.
But in contrast to their positive reaction to the initial bailout decision, bondholders exhibited no reaction to the specific terms of the bailout that emerged over the subsequent months and that purportedly favored the union over secured creditors.
Bondholders also shrugged of the court decisions that put a judicial stamp of approval on the arrangement. The results reject the argument of the bailout's critics, that the bailout would be perceived by bondholders as establishing a precedent for future subordination of creditors in bankruptcy. the government signaled its willingness to stand behind large, struggling companies, especially those with high unionization rates. As a result of this signal that large, unionized companies have become too-big-to-fail, investors believed that the debt of these companies had become less risky.
The perception that certain large troubled companies have become public bailouts candidates has economy-wide ramifications. It enables such troubled companies to borrow more cheaply than they could in the absence of an implicit government guarantee.
Hence, capital flows to firms that should otherwise fail. In this respect, the Chrysler bailout will have unfortunate consequences for the economy. Ohlson (1985) default score. Idiosyncratic volatility, idiovol, is calculated relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model. bm is the bookto-market ratio. lme is the log of market capitalization. nimtavg measures profitability and is calculated as a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market value of total assets. Leverage is measured by tlmta, which is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets. Chs-pd is the default probability, calculated as in Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) . Merton-DD is the Merton (1974) distance-to-default measure. The computation of merton-DD is described in detail in Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) . Rating is the S&P 500 rating, where the rating has been converted to numeric values (AAA = 1, …, C = 13). maturity is the average maturity of the bonds for a firm and is measured in years. Statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. ) of portfolio of unionized (Panel A) and non-unionized companies (Panel B), as well as a portfolio formed by going long unionized and short non-unionized companies (Panel C), are regressed on risk factors and a dummy variable (DATE_DUMMY) that takes on a value of one in the three days (t-1,t,t+1) around the specified event date. MKT is the market risk premium, SMB is the size factor, HML is the value factor, computed as in Fama and French (1993) . TERM is the return on long-term treasury bonds minus the return on short-term (three month) treasuries. DEF is the return on value-weighted long-term corporate bonds minus the return on long-term treasury bonds. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
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